By Katharina T. Kraus
Abstract:The chapter explores a Kantian approach to the philosophy of science, focusing on the principle of systematicity, according to which nature is regarded as systematically unified. By introducing Kant’s account of systematicity in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the chapter identifies the philosophical issue that it addresses, namely the underdetermination of our scientific view of the world. Against the prevailing methodological reading, it is argued that the demand of systematicity is for Kant a transcendental principle of empirical cognition in general, which concerns the very intelligibility of nature. A discussion of its philosophical significance for contemporary philosophy of science suggests that a Kantian approach is a serious alternative to naturalistic theories of science. A Kantian philosophy of science not only demonstrates the indispensable role of principles of systematicity for our scientific practice, but also offers an attractive explanation for the diversity of the sciences and their relative but irreducible autonomy.
Published:
London: Routledge, 2023
DOI:
doi.org/10.4324/9781003406617
Online available:
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